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Rights in the Shadow of Class: 
Poverty, Welfare, and the Law 
FRANK MUNGER 
Persistent poverty is a source of conspicuous failure in developed economies such as 
the United States, which boasts of its affluence and vigorously advocates free labor 
markets, laissez faire capitalism, and law around the globe. To many, it seems self- 
evident that the extremes of wealth and power created by a capitalist economy and 
free labor market will result in unequal justice for rich and poor. Documenting and 
explaining the legal inequities experienced by poor people has appealed to the 
critical impulse of sociolegal scholars who perceive the treatment of those who 
live in poverty as an important example of flaws in the law's promise of equal justice. 
Sociolegal research on the legal experiences of the poor reflects an understanding 
of the close connection between economic inequality and law. Yet economic inequal- 
ity has always created a dilemma for sociolegal scholars. Early sociolegal research 
was embedded in the values of liberal legalism and the perspectives of American 
social science. Although sociolegal scholarship is often critical of liberal legalism, it 
has been strongly influenced by it. Liberal legalism accepts the legitimacy of eco- 
nomic inequality and simultaneously maintains that equal justice is achievable. 
Because economic inequality is morally acceptable there is a presumption that 
legal inequities are transient, that law can be insulated from social differences, 
and, at the same time, that many policies creating or preserving economic differences 
are legitimate. As a result, injustice caused by morally condemned extremes of 
poverty has been an easier target for sociolegal scholars than class inequalities 
sustaining the economic core of capitalism. 
Further, American social science was shaped from its early stages by the pragma- 
tism of the Chicago School, which turned away from European social theories of 
class according to which poverty and class conflict are inevitable by-products of 
unregulated capitalism (Simon, 1999). Chicago School sociology embraced a per- 
spective more consistent with the faith that America is a "classless" society, conceiv- 
ing of poverty as a product of transient social disorganization, dysfunction, and 
individual failure, while the forces of the market were considered an inevitable, 
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indeed foundational, aspect of American society. Alice O'Connor's (2001) percep- 
tive history identifies this perspective as a problem at the core of "poverty know- 
ledge." Poverty scholars have persistently focused on the capacities and 
competitiveness of the poor. When they have also considered the political and 
institutional sources of poverty they have failed to develop an effective counter- 
perspective to the popular political discourse about the poor's moral failure and 
individual accountability; to the contrary they have reinforced that perspective by 
the amount of time and attention they have devoted to it, making it more complex 
and nuanced, but never effectively contesting its legitimacy. 
If sociolegal studies have been swept along by the tide of development in Ameri- 
can social science (Sarat and Simon, 2001; Simon, 1999), they have also kept alive a 
critical perspective, growing from legal realism's critique of liberal legalism's claims 
and strengthened by the contributions of the critical legal studies movement. Re- 
search blends different, sometimes inconsistent, explanations of the relationship 
between poverty and law. Some scholars, like O'Connor, perceive that poverty 
springs from the relationship between those who benefit from a competitive labor 
market and a capitalist economy and those who inevitably suffer (see Wright, 1994 ). 
According to this relational perspective, poverty arises from systemic sources, and 
poverty relief inevitably creates conflict between groups with different economic and 
political interests. Few sociolegal studies actually pursue the implications of this 
perspective. More frequently, a second perspective prevails, which focuses on differ- 
ences between the poor and the mainstream. This approach emphasizes how law 
matters to poor individuals - how poor persons' perceptions of law, legal capacities, 
and experiences of law and legal culture are different from those of other persons. 
While research from an individual perspective may illuminate the shortcomings of 
liberal legalism, research must adopt a relational perspective to explore the law's 
role in poverty's persistence, welfare's failure, and the promise of rights. 
This chapter describes three approaches to research on poverty and law that blend 
these contrasting perspectives. During the civil rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, 
sociolegal research on poverty focused on the failure of law's promise of equal justice 
for the poor. A second type of research, evolving out of the first, examines how law 
matters from the perspective of the poor. This research has studied, in particular, the 
"legal consciousness" of poor persons that illuminates practices of legal domination 
and resistance in everyday life. Contemporary scholars increasingly pursue a 
third approach that examines welfare state politics and administration. Through 
this approach, scholars are examining whether law assists in the realization of 
power and privilege for some through welfare state institutions that create poverty 
and dependency for others. 
Critical examination of the relationship between law, poverty, and the welfare 
state has had little effect on policy makers. Why should that concern us? Some have 
suggested that sociolegal studies should ignore the "pull of the policy audience" 
(Sarat and Silbey, 1988). But many poverty scholars believe that turning away from 
power holders defeats what they believe to be a central purpose of their work (see 
Ewick, Kagan, and Sarat, 1999; Handler, 1992; Gilliom, 2001). Scholars face the 
challenge of conducting research that will deepen the understanding of citizens and 
policy makers without allowing the myths, stereotypes, and misconceptions created 
by the politics of public discourse on the poor to narrow their vision. This chapter 
concludes by describing two difficult issues confronting scholars who hope to change 
policies that oppress and exclude poor persons - race and political power. Race, 
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Blumberg, similarly, explains his research by drawing into question the impact of 
recent legal decisions that protected the rights of criminal defendants. Yet the insight 
he derives from his study of defenders' interactions with prosecutors and judges is 
not limited to the formal defects in implementation of legal norms. He describes in 
some detail the process by which interactions with other participants coopt the role 
of defense attorneys and influence their relationships with clients. 
Both studies contain the seeds of future trends in sociolegal research on the "legal 
consciousness" of poor persons, the influence of context, and the social interests that 
compete with the law's formal assumptions about the goals of legal process. Both 
bring into focus the importance of the participants themselves - the competence, 
resources, and dispositions they bring to the process. With respect to the latter, 
Carlin et al. offered an extended analysis of the "legal competence" of the poor 
litigant. 
Levine and Preston (1970) surveyed poor persons concerning their "resource 
orientation" - the likelihood that they would make use of an attorney to resolve a 
dispute. The survey showed overwhelmingly that the poor lacked knowledge of their 
rights and of the availability of legal services lawyers. Those poor who had know- 
ledge often believed they would lose, a belief that discouraged them from contacting 
a lawyer. Likewise, Felstiner's (1974) analysis of dispute behavior concluded that the 
poor are far more likely to "lump" than litigate their grievances. Levine and Preston 
also showed that there was considerable variation in knowledge, b'ut a "positive" 
resource orientation was concentrated among younger, white, poor persons. 
Studies on which Carlin et al. drew in their analysis viewed the poor as a 
particularly unfortunate and vulnerable group that was frequently victimized (see 
Caplovitz, 1963 who studied unethical dealing with poor consumers; Wald, 1965 
reporting oppressive treatment of welfare recipients by creditors in the automobile 
market; Note, 1965 describing lax code enforcement in low-rent housing). Victim- 
ization followed from the poor's lack of market alternatives, lack of political power, 
consignment to less rights-oriented legal forums, and lack of knowledge and re- 
sources to contest wrongful treatment. In each of these ways, the poor were depicted 
as different from the mainstream and unable to protect themselves. The failure of 
law to protect the poor drew both legal and sociolegal scholars to examine the roles 
played by attorneys who represented the poor (see Carlin, 1962; Carlin and 
Howard, 1965; O'Gorman, 1963; Katz, 1978; Abel, 1979; Handler, Hollingsworth, 
and Erlanger, 1978). 
Some of O'Connor's criticisms of American poverty research apply to these civil 
rights era studies of poverty and law. Carlin and his coauthors studied only the poor; 
for them, the term "class" has no particularly political or relational meaning. 
Blumberg made no comparisons between rich and poor (still less between social 
classes), though the ability of defense attorneys to conduct a "confidence game" may 
have depended in significant part on the class differences among the participants he 
describes (e.g., clients versus attorneys, public defenders versus attorneys in white- 
collar civil or criminal matters). The inevitable link between poor clients and 
criminal justice is too obvious for comment. Although civil rights era research did 
more than document the limits of liberal legal justice, it seldom explored the origins 
of poverty, the politics underlying policies, or whether the economic inequality was 
created or sustained by law. 
The studies ignored an important tradition of research on African American 
poverty that probed the sources of poverty and placed lives in context, including 
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interactions with authorities (DuBois, 1899; Frazier, 1939; Liebow, 1967; Stack, 
1976; Ladner, 1971). Further, scholars emphasized the unique characteristics of poor 
individuals, not the causes of their social circumstances. Criminal justice scholars, 
who studied the legal processes most involved with the poor, seldom gave critical 
attention to individuals' poverty or class (contrast Chambliss, 1964 and Hagan, 
1994). Conceptualizing poverty in relational terms might have led to different 
questions: whether the disadvantages experienced by some are sustained by benefits 
they confer on others, and, in particular, who is advantaged by the particular kind of 
competence required by the legal system? 
Finally, this research offered a limited view of legal process. Reich's arguments 
about the importance of entitlements were widely discussed but little sociolegal 
research pursued their implications for the poor. Poor persons encounter adminis- 
trative decision makers relatively more frequently (Mayhew and Reiss, 1969) and 
are more likely to face informal but coercive administrative decision making than 
wealthier citizens (Lipsky, 1984). When poverty programs moved off the scene in the 
1970s and 1980s, sociolegal poverty research all but disappeared. 
Galanter's (1974) seminal essay, "Why the 'haves' come out ahead" took stock of 
the critique of liberal legalism's promise to "have nots." The overwhelming evidence 
of bias against "have nots" showed that the capacity of the law to bring about social 
change was limited by the very social factors that formal changes in the law were 
intended to neutralize. Galanter's synthesis is powerful because the legal system's 
bias was not limited to subordinate persons such as the incompetent poor but 
worked against other individuals as well whose lack of experience and resources 
disadvantage them. But Galanter's synthesis focused, like much mainstream poverty 
research, on the competitive disadvantages of individuals. Differences in litigants' 
legal competence, together with the legal system's inherent inability to alter the 
effects of this social inequality, create legal bias. Because his essay focuses on legal 
process rather than social relationships, Galanter did not explore the legal bases for 
class privilege or power, but limited his discussion to the process by which those with 
power use law to their advantage. 
"Haves" is a summation but also a turning point that can be readily marked in 
research on poverty. Scholars were already moving away from a self-contained view 
of legal process. Legal process was not passive and reactive. Law and its context 
were interactive, and law helped to constitute the social relations that led to legal 
inequality. Increasingly sophisticated studies showed the varieties of legal experience 
of individuals in different social roles, contexts, and backgrounds, problematizing 
the very concept of legal equality (Mayhew and Reiss, 1969; Moore, 1974; and 
Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, 1980). These trends suggested to many scholars that 
analysis of the relationship between social hierarchy and legal inequality should be 
studied from a more subjective perspective and in the varied contexts of everyday 
experience. 
How LAW MATTERS FOR THE Po o n - LEGAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS, DOMINATION, RESISTANCE 
Poverty research of the civil rights era was transformed by the collapse of the War on 
Poverty. A conservative backlash against civil rights and poverty rights, termination 
or cutback of many poverty programs, and racial politics made the work of proges- 
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sive and critical poverty scholars unwelcome among policy makers and discouraged 
new research projects. Since the 1970s, government-sponsored poverty research has 
been carefully limited to program evaluation and impact studies, narrowly focused 
on incremental program goals (Katz, 1989). 
For scholars outside the narrowing mainstream of government-sponsored poverty 
research, a critical perspective on poverty was maintained within an evolving field of 
sociolegal research. An important shift in perspective marked this evolution. The 
new trope - law in context - focused on the disjunction between formal law and 
law's role in context - law in everyday life. Greater attention was given to the law's 
noninstrumental roles in everyday life - symbolic, contested, and constitutive. The 
new perspective made the interpretations of ordinary persons central to understand- 
ing the meaning and effects of law. Ordinary persons interpreted and gave meaning 
to law at sites of everyday interaction and contention such as families, neighbor- ' 
hoods, and workplaces as well as in lawyers' offices and courts. 
Studying law in everyday life provided an important new window on inequality 
and domination, and "legal consciousness" became a focus of such studies. The 
poor, women, African Americans, were no longer simply categories of litigants. Law 
shaped their consciousness as individuals and citizens and thus influenced their 
routines and interactions in everyday life. The poor and oppressed, as legal actors, 
acquired agency both as individuals and as actors within systems of culture and 
meaning through the development of their legal consciousness. Indeed, the emphasis 
on agency became a defining element of critical research on law, which claimed to 
give voice to the "other" - a voice that had previously been. lost in the larger picture 
of liberal legalism and legal process (Silbey and Sarat, 1987). 
Three influential studies illustrate this pursuit. Ewick and Silbey (1992) describe 
the legal consciousness of "Millie," a poor black domestic housekeeper charged with 
a hit and run accident involving her uninsured car while it was being driven by a 
friend of a relative without her permission. Austin Sarat describes the legal con- 
sciousness of the "welfare poor," who seek assistance from legal services attorneys, 
concluding that it is "substantially different from other groups in society for whom 
law is a less immediate and visible presence" (1990: 344). Lucie White (1990) 
studies the welfare hearing of "Mrs. G.," examining the culture and history that 
shapes subordination. She suggests that the law seamlessly reinforces the inequalities 
experienced by her client throughout her life and creates a consciousness of humili- 
ation - as a morally stigmatized recipient, intimidation - because her voice is 
silenced in welfare proceedings, and objectification - displacement of her true 
needs by bureaucratic definitions of "needs" and "entitlements." 
The concept of legal consciousness has had an important influence on studies of 
law and poverty, for example, research on legal process (Mahoney, 1991; Alfieri, 
1993), the attorney-client relationship (Alfieri, 1991, 2001; Davis, 1993; Harris, 
1999; Lopez, 1992; Trubek, 1994; White, 1988; Sarat and Felstiner, 1995; for 
critique see Simon, 1996), and the impact of specific welfare laws (see below). 
Perhaps the most profound and controversial influence, however, has been on the 
way scholars perceive the distributive impact of law, for above all these studies 
suggest that the subtle influence of legal consciousness on legal process and legal 
rights explains - one more time - why the "haves" come out ahead. Engel (1998) 
criticizes these studies for conceptualizing the legal consciousness of the poor cat- 
egorically. Legal consciousness, he argues, is treated as a collective mindset repro- 
duced by law rather than the end product of an interactive and intersubjective 
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process that shapes each individual's consciousness. For Ewick and Silbey, Sarat, and 
White, the agency of subordinate persons in such settings is resistance and "tactical." 
Engel also suggests that legal consciousness research has overlooked insights long 
established in the sociolegal field - potential variation in legal consciousness over 
different substantive areas of law, the multicentered relationship between law and 
society, and the mediation of unofficial systems of rules and meanings. 
The problem of agency 
At stake in the analysis of the law's role in power and resistance is the capacity of the 
poor for self-help and for political struggle. Critics McCann and March (1996) 
argue that scholars have been too quick to declare poor persons independent and 
autonomous actors on the basis of isolated acts of disobedience or circumvention of 
the law. Progressive scholars believe change from the bottom up is necessary for 
lasting democratic and egalitarian reform, and they resist the image of subordinate 
persons as passive, apathetic, or possessing false beliefs in the legitimacy of oppres- 
sive authority. But misjudging the autonomy of the poor can have negative conse- 
quences, Handler (2002) argues, because the image of the poor as willful and 
capable accords well with the arguments of conservatives and the moral politics of 
welfare that blame the poor for their poverty. 
McCann and March find that three justifications for the significance of such "little 
events" are suggested by the studies themselves. The first is that the studies map 
"oppositional consciousness," debunking the theory that subordinate persons pos- 
sess a false consciousness of the "myth of rights." These findings are similar to those 
of a long line of Marxist social historians (Hay, 1975; Thompson, 1975; Genovese, 
1976). 
Second, small acts of resistance may be "significant in a psychological, or existen- 
tial sense" because they affirm "basic dignity, autonomy, and personhood" (McCann 
and March, 1996: 226). But McCann and March are deeply skeptical about such 
claims, concluding that "many of these works could be read as sorry accounts of 
experiences that only deepen the sense of what John Gaventa (1980) calls 'power- 
lessness' among marginalized citizens" (McCann and March, 1996: 227; cf. 
Roberts, 2000), and studies confirm his conclusion (White, 1993; Soss, 1999). 
Handler (1996, 2002) argues that isolated acts of resistance can be empowering 
only as part of a developmental process, such as that described in White's (2002, and 
in preparation) study of mothers in a Head Start program. Similarly, Gilliom's 
(2001) interviews with poor Appalachian women about welfare surveillance sug- 
gested to him that everyday acts of resistance could "work as forms of politics" 
where particular conditions were met - tangible improvements, sharing and collab- 
oration among participants, and "ethical grounding or ideology within which to 
frame resistant practices" (Gilliom, 2001: 103). Gilliom found the women countered 
control by embracing an ethic of care that elevated commitments to others over 
compliance with welfare regulations. 
A third justification for studying everyday acts of resistance is their potential for 
political escalation. Yet most studies of law and everyday resistance have focused on 
the actions of isolated individuals, with little examination of their relationships to 
group identity or support, making them unlikely candidates for collective political 
action. Context is critical for the political potential of law. Understanding the 
politics of power and resistance requires a frame of reference that indicates what 
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is at stake and what is gained or lost in particular encounters between dominant and 
subordinate persons, that is, a relational framework of understanding. Moreover, 
resistance with the potential to escalate politically is about broad struggles - against 
racism, economic exploitation, or patriarchal control - and not merely tactical 
maneuvering against judges, clerks, administrators or other officials (McCann and 
March, 1996: 220; cf. Handler, 1992). In brief, scholars studying the legal con- 
sciousness of poor persons must pay more attention to the social organization and 
institutional context underlying domination and resistance. 
WELFARE STATE ADMINISTRATION - 
DEPENDENCY BY LAW 
Contemporary scholars recognize the continuing but contingent role of state power 
in creating and maintaining poverty, and many are also interested in reconstituting 
the welfare state - a search for an affirmative and more democratic welfare state 
(Garland, 2001; Sarat and Simon, 2001; Handler and Hasenfeld, 1997). The Ameri- 
can welfare state's long history of stigmatizing and inadequate assistance for the 
poor might well make us doubt whether truly affirmative programs will be adopted 
without substantial political change. Both civil rights era impact research and studies 
of legal consciousness suggest that the poor will often be among the most oppressed 
and the least capable of politically altering this familiar pattern. 
Sociolegal scholars have been energized not only by frustration with their declining 
influence in an era of "cultural politics" (Simon, 1999; Garth and Sterling, 1998), but 
also by concern about the effects of welfare state retrenchment on minorities, immi- 
grants, workers, women, and the poor. Global crises connecting First and Third 
World economies have always enhanced the critical understanding of sociolegal 
scholars, and some poverty scholars have explored this connection in their research 
(e.g., Handler, 2003; Coombe, 1995; Santos, 1995; White, 1998; Nightingale, 2qo2). 
Critical scholarship - race, gender, class, in the welfare state 
If, as McCann and March claim, research on legal consciousness of the poor requires 
a relational and political perspective, critical race and critical feminist scholars have 
played an important role not only by developing a relational perspective on poor 
women and minorities, but also by addressing the issue of political voice. Critical 
feminist and critical race scholars were among the first to place legal domination of 
poor women and minorities in historical and institutional context and, in this 
context, to explore the role of emancipatory practices capable of undermining 
legal domination. 
Critical histories of the evolution of poverty and welfare set the stage for sociolegal 
research on contemporary welfare state policy and its administration. Although a 
generation of progressive scholars of working-class conflict examined the role of law 
in class domination and politics (Piven and Cloward, 1971; Hay, 197~; Thompson, 
1975), Gordon (1988b) criticized them for ignoring the evolving nature of poverty, in 
particular its concentration among minorities and women, groups never assimilated 
into the primary labor market and unlikely to participate in the class struggles 
envisioned by nineteenth-century theorists (see also Quadagno, 1992). Critical 
feminist and critical race historians (Gordon, 1988a, 1994; Quadagno, 1994; Sterett, 
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1997; Skocpol, 1992) have transformed our understanding by showing that patri- 
archy and racism have molded the character of the American system of public relief. 
Fraser and Gordon (1994) trace the cultural shifts in the concept of "dependency" 
that prefigured (and were reinforced by) these welfare policies. Dependency carries 
taken-for-granted connotations that limit the discourse about welfare, especially 
assumptions about "human nature, gender roles, the causes of poverty, the nature 
of citizenship, the sources of entitlement, and what counts as work and as a 
contribution to society" (Fraser and Gordon, 1994: 311). 
Significantly, critical race and feminist scholars place the identities and conscious- 
ness of poor persons in a concrete historical and relational context. They have 
demonstrated that a relational view of inequality was essential- inequality continues 
because of the support for institutions that maintain patriarchy and white privilege. 
Further, critical scholars emphasize the importance of variations in context and 
perspective in determining the role that rights play in the lives of weak and powerless 
persons. While rights often constituted domination of the oppressed, historical 
examples showed that they could also be turned to the advantage of subordinate 
persons under circumstances that permitted their movements to gain power 
(Crenshaw, 1988; Schneider, 1986; see also Piven and Cloward, 1977). The role of 
rights, they argued, also depended on voice and perspective. Minow's (1990) analy- 
sis of contemporary and historical examples showed that the law may promote 
inclusion and full citizenship when the experiences of those who have experienced 
poverty and oppression influence legislative, administrative, or judicial processes. 
Conversely, she traces the counterintuitive stigmatizing effects of many civil rights 
laws to their origin in the consciousness of legislators, judges, and professionals who 
lack a complete understanding of the ways that society creates the disadvantages 
encountered by the oppressed. 
Finally, critical scholars' sensitivity to voice has caused them to raise important 
questions about studies of domination and oppression - how can scholars "know" 
the experiences of socially oppressed groups and interpret or "give voice" to their 
concerns (see Minow, 1990: 195-8; cf. Sarat, 1990; White, 1990)? The importance 
of the poor's own voice in the realization of rights suggests to some scholars that the 
poor must play a central role in the research enterprise itself, shaping issues, 
gathering and interpreting data, and discovering ways to deploy rights for change 
(Ansley, 2002). 
Critical scholarship on poverty and the welfare state, like studies of legal con- 
sciousness and law in everyday life, have strengthened the growing perception 
among poverty scholars that the poor are active rather than apathetic and have 
experiences and values as varied as the mainstream. Scholars have begun to shift 
their attention to understanding how the poor "navigate the welfare state from 
below" (Katz, personal communication, 1997). The question is, what have scholars 
learned about the welfare state and how does that enrich their research on poverty 
and law? 
Moral citizenship 
Critical history of poverty law shows that fundamental economic conflicts that 
divide society along lines of class, gender, and race underlie welfare state policies: 
the desire of employers and the well-to-do to preserve the advantages they derive 
from the market versus the desire of workers, working poor, unemployed caretakers 
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and others unable to obtain a living wage job for greater economic security (Katz, 
1986, 1989; Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991; Fraser and Gordon, 1994). Why do 
these economic conflicts rarely emerge in public discourse? 
The history of Anglo-American welfare policy shows that economic interests of 
groups divided by class, race, and gender have been expressed in a discourse of 
moral identity and social citizenship (Gordon, 1994; Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991). 
Eligibility for social provision has never been a universal right, but rather a residual 
for those deserving poor who cannot support themselves. Sociolegal poverty 
scholars, among others, have described the important distinction drawn between 
the deserving poor, who merit social insurance and protection against the hardships 
of the free labor market, and the undeserving poor, who merit help only in times of 
severe hardship and under conditions intended to reform their flawed moral charac- 
ter (Katz, 1986, 1989; Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991; Fraser and Gordon, 1994). In ' 
this respect, social rights resemble a contract rather than a universal citizenship 
entitlement (cf. Mead, 1986). Individuals are obligated to make themselves self- 
sufficient by fulfilling the roles - as wage earner, as wife of a wage earner, as a 
married parent - that society envisions for them. Those who do not conform are 
undeserving of welfare (Pearce, 1990; Mink, 1990). 
Welfare law plays a different role in other cultures that associate different iden- 
tities with dependency. Anglo-American culture is representative of societies that 
Esping-Anderson terms "liberal" welfare regimes," that place "unbounded faith in 
market sovereignty" (1990, 1999: 81) and offer low level, means-tested welfare 
benefits designed to reinforce labor market participation (others are Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada). Most European countries - such as Austria, France, 
Germany, and Italy - together with Japan have "conservative" welfare regimes that 
emphasize preservation of family and social status, for example by providing family 
benefits sufficient to allow women to remain at home in traditional nonworking 
roles. Scandinavian countries have "social democratic" welfare regimes that decom- 
modify labor through universal, nonmeans-tested benefits. In theory, the implica- 
tions of differences between these regimes for the moral identity of welfare recipients 
are great. Handler (2002) has argued that the regimes are converging in practice due 
to the growing strength of conservative ideology and to inevitable similarities of 
bureaucratic behavior. But whether or not there are additional points of similarity or 
difference, the strong association between historical development, moral discourse, 
and social provision seems beyond question. 
The moral content of the discourse of social citizenship has provided a powerful 
tool for explaining the details of welfare policy (Gordon, 1988b; Skocpol, 1992; 
Sterett, 1997), the evolution and impact of social movements for poverty rights 
(Piven and Cloward, 1977; Handler, 1978), and the role of gender and race in the 
relationship between poverty lawyers and their clients (Davis, 1993; Lopez, 1992; 
Alfieri, 1991). Fraser and Gordon (1994) trace the relationship between the 
changing moral stigma of "dependency" and welfare in the twentieth century. 
Early programs stigmatized particular women - poor, immigrant, unmarried - but 
not others, for example the white widow. With the increasing enrollment of unmar- 
ried African American women in Aid to Families with Dependent Chiidren (AFDC) 
in the 1960s, the image of deviant dependency was again a mirror image of white, 
middle-class normality - now the unmarried female head of an African American 
household. Disturbed by rising rates of .ernployment among mothers in white fam- 
ilies, increasing divorce and declining marriage rates, Americans experienced a 
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"moral panic about dependency" in the 1980s (Fraser and Gordon, 1994 ). Welfare 
reform in the 1990s reflects the latest politically inspired image - generations of 
African American teenage mothers trapped by welfare in a cycle of helpless depend- 
ency (see P. Williams, 1991; Roberts, 1997b, 1999). 
Above all, Garland (2001) argues, the emphasis of the market on voluntary choice 
grounds the moral identity assigned to persons. The poor, the unemployed, the 
unmarried, the underqualified, the discriminated against, the abused who cannot 
work or cannot earn enough for themselves and their families to survive are pre- 
sumed to have chosen not to work and to rely on welfare. They are subjected to 
discipline in exchange for benefits under conditions designed to make them seek 
work and behave in other ways deemed appropriate for citizenship by achieving self- 
sufficiency through work or marriage and by discouraging the "moral hazard" of 
unnecessary reliance on benefits. 
A substantial body of scholarship describes policies reflecting welfare mothers' 
moral identity and ignoring their actual behavior and experiences (Fraser and 
Gordon, 1994; see also Fineman, 1999; J.A. White, 2000; Roberts, 1997b; 
McKinnon, 1993; Karst, 1989). Studies of poor women examine the origins and 
effects of morally stigmatizing welfare policies that inhibit rather than help poor 
women in performing the labor that society tacitly demands - responsibly caring for 
families (Gordon, 1994; Edin and Lein, 1997; McClain, 1996; Raphael, 1996; 
Gilliom, 2001). Some welfare policies, particularly those affecting reproductive 
rights, have been applied with a marked racial bias and reflect stereotypes that 
prevailed in the welfare reform discourse of the 1990s about the unfitness of 
young black women for parenting (Roberts, 1997a). Similarly, state officials have 
continued to remove a disproportionate number of black children from their 
mothers and place them in foster care (Roberts, 1999). Scholars describe a mismatch 
between the images of welfare recipients and their actual lives that turns the public 
face of assistance and rehabilitation into a less visible reality of inappropriate and 
punitive effects (L. Williams, 1992). 
Myth and ceremony in administration 
One of the most provocative observations in Galanter's (1974) massive mapping of 
legal process appears almost as an afterthought in a long aside on "appended" 
dispute resolution systems, including administrative adjudication, mediation, nego- 
tiation, and nonlegal dispute resolution. He suggested that resort to appended 
systems was less about rights and more about restoring relationships, but his 
characterization ignored precisely the problem of "class" justice. Because the rapidly 
increasing importance of welfare state entitlements shifted rights disputes from 
courts to bureaucracies for many citizens but for poor citizens in particular, for the 
poor, this exception threatened to swallow his paradigm. The relatively poor and 
powerless, far more than the affluent and powerful, encounter layers of informal 
administrative decision making respecting important rights. 
Because welfare policies are based on moral identity as well as on the needs of the 
poor, Handler and Hasenfeld (1991) argue that there has always been a wide gap 
between the rhetoric of poverty policies and the practical administration of welfare. 
They refer to the gap as the "myth and ceremony" of welfare policy- "myth" because 
of the discourse of policy making and legislation that relies on stereotypical and 
contradictory images of the poor, and "ceremony" because difficulties in adminis- 
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tering policies that bear little relation to the real needs of poor people typically result 
in token enforcement for a few recipients and widespread, unacknowledged adminis- 
trative default for the rest. Policies requiring welfare recipients to work have historic- 
ally been impossible to enforce because they have ignored the real problems that the 
labor market creates for those who are poor. For example, in the early 1960s, the law 
required social services for recipients but in reality agencies lacked the capacity and 
had little incentive to provide such services (Handler, 1990). Rising welfare roles due 
in part to an aggressive welfare rights movement eventually ended ceremonial com- 
pliance as formal emphasis shifted to eligibility determination (W. Simon, 1983). 
Research suggests that recent welfare reforms will repeat the pattern. Welfare 
reform has tightened work requirements, imposed lifetime time limits, and added 
other restrictions that require close supervision and enforcement (Kost and Munger, 
1996). Women who are particularly creative in acquiring support from others in a 
resource-poor environment are more successful in maintaining employment (Henly, 
2002) and raising children (Edin and Lein, 1997), but they often must violate specific 
mandates of the welfare law in order to maintain their families (Gilliom, 2001). 
Those with multiple barriers to employment - such as lack of education or transpor- 
tation - or who have a disability (up to 40 percent of the deeply impoverished) 
cannot work (Danziger et al., 1999). Welfare administrators offer meager assistance 
in coping with these problems, and yet all recipients face mandatory time limits on 
welfare. The new law encourages sanctioning recipients for their "voluntary" failure 
to comply by reducing or ending welfare support without respect to need. Reviewing 
these and other studies, Handler and Hasenfeld (1997) conclude that the moral 
images that influence welfare legislation will lead to more myth and ceremony. 
The myth that a formal declaration of entitlement to welfare will guarantee 
benefits has long been discredited by studies showing that administrative practices 
impeding recipients' efforts to become eligible result in "bureaucratic disentitle- 
ment" (Lipsky, 1984; see also Bennett, 1995). Caseworkers, like legislators, are 
influenced by their "moral typification" of recipients (Hasenfeld, 1983; Brodkin, 
1997). The myth that formal policies and due process will guarantee individual 
autonomy and empowerment has been thoroughly examined and criticized by 
Simon (1983) and by Handler (1986, 1990). 
Empowerment of welfare recipients may be even more difficult in the new era of 
entrepreneurial government and management by objective. Under the new system, 
welfare caseworkers are given even more discretion to achieve the goals set by 
supervisors, but Diller (2000) suggests that top-down control continues to be exer- 
cised in ways that limit the range of outcomes of client-caseworker interaction, if 
not the means by which they may be achieved. Serious questions arise about whether 
liberal legalism can insure that discretion is exercised without arbitrariness or 
discrimination. How much discretion entrepreneurial government creates in prac- 
tice, how such discretion will be used, and whether there are effective means of 
checking abuses are important issues for further research (see, e.g., a rare study of 
racial bias in welfare by Gooden, 1998). 
Welfare as "private government" 
Macaulay's ( 1986) insightful analysis of "private government" reminds us that social 
networks, neighborhoods, associations; corporations, contracts and other private 
relations that "govern" individuals often mediate the effects of public policy and law. 
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He reminds us that the law's attempts to set terms for relationships within organiza- 
tions or between contracting parties rarely counters existing imbalances in power. 
Macaulay's analysis also encourages looking beyond welfare administration to its 
impact on the social relationships in the private world of welfare recipients which 
welfare law ultimately attempts to govern. 
Sociolegal scholarship suggests that his insight is particularly applicable to postre- 
form welfare administration where multiple layers of public and private organiza- 
tion interact and mediate in carrying out federal and state mandates. Two concepts 
laden with market ideology - devolution and privatization - have legitimated giving 
more control of welfare to state and local governments and permitting private 
service providers to assume responsibilities for welfare previously assumed by public 
servants (Katz, 2001). Both concepts suggest that greater efficiency will be achieved 
- more effective welfare at lower cost. In truth the system of welfare in the USA has 
always been highly decentralized. States and their subdivisions have administered 
federally funded welfare since the program's inception and private providers have 
always played an important role. 
States have responded to the devolution of new responsibilities by giving local 
administrators even more control and by contracting out core welfare administra- 
tion as well as more specialized services. State and local politics control the level of 
welfare spending as well as the symbolic emphasis placed on work and supporting 
services (Cashin, 1999). Reliance on private entrepreneurs to provide administration 
of welfare depends on a contracting process controlled by administrators beholden 
to the same political constitutencies who resist spending and restrict welfare 
(Bezdek, 2001). 
Gilliom (2001) has shown that increasingly intrusive welfare surveillance and 
control of recipients harms welfare recipients' relationships with others and their 
self-images. The myth of welfare reform is that strict accountability will ultimately 
strengthen poor women's social capital, but the reality is that such intrusive adminis- 
tration often undermines existing social relationships and impedes investment in 
new social capital (Edin and Lein, 1997; Stack, 1976). Gilliom's interviewees found 
that evasion and circumvention of welfare law were necessary for survival of their 
families but in turn this often unavoidable behavior had harmful effects on their self- 
image as moral citizens (Gilliom, 2001; contrast Rothstein, 2001). 
Thus there is a risk that decentralization will simply disguise the process of 
domination of welfare recipients who will not be helped to achieve self-sufficiency 
and whose failure will confirm the myth of their dependency. Welfare recipients will 
have become even more dependent by law (Munger, 2002). While some have argued 
for revival of a stronger welfare state (Lowi, 1998; Karst, 1997), others point to 
research suggesting that the outcome of devolution and privatization is indetermin- 
ate. Handler (1996), for example, describes case studies that show that empower- 
ment can be achieved when the administrative priorities of the powerful are 
contested politically and also through "empowerment by invitation" when adminis- 
tration creates opportunities for development of self-confidence and participatory 
competence. He suggests that the latter form of empowerment is possible only when 
power holders gain something from participation by dependent people, such as 
stability, profitability, or legitimacy, and when such opportunities continue long 
enough to allow a sense of efficacy and trust in participation to develop (Handler, 
2002). Lucie White's (2002) analysis of mothers' empowerment through participa- 
tion in a Head Start program illustrates his argument. 
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Sociolegal research on the administration of welfare in the welfare state is poised 
to break new ground by focusing on the complexity of organizational and insti- 
tutional structures and processes that shape the law's symbolic and constitutive 
impact. State, local, and private compliance with statutory (and constitutional) 
welfare law requirements; the spread of welfare program innovations among the 
states (see, e.g., Soule and Zylan, 1997); symbolic compliance at the institutional 
level; the "capture" of local programs by their social, political, and economic 
context - all seem ripe for study. In turn, sociolegal poverty scholars exploring the 
cultural and symbolic roles of law in the welfare state can benefit from available 
literatures on the new institutionalism and organizational theory (Suchman and 
Edelman, 1996; see also Smith, 1988) that address these and similar processes of 
organizational change and development. 
GOVERNING THROUGH POVERTY - Two CHALLENGES 
FOR RESEARCH 
The Russell Sage Foundation (Farley, Danziger, and Holzer, 2000) began its analysis 
of the relationship between race and poverty in Detroit by asking why blacks and 
whites live in segregated communities 50 years after racial covenants were declared 
unconstitutional and 30 years after the Fair Housing Act outlawed racial discrimin- 
ation in the housing market. The Foundation's sociologists find an answer in public 
attitudes toward race. They do not comment, as they should, that the law's role has 
been shaped by the same racial divide, notwithstanding seemingly benign actions of 
the Supreme Court and Congress (cf. Freeman, 1998). Sociolegal scholars have 
much to contribute to an understanding of law's complex role in maintaining the 
welfare state's institutions that divide social classes and exclude many from equal 
opportunity. 
The problem of race 
Lee Rainwater (1970) and Herbert Gans (1969), in separate essays, tried to explain 
why oppressive poverty policies seemed different and difficult to attack politically. 
Rainwater guessed that the wretched conditions and insecurity of the poor were 
threatening to the mainstream, whose security and affluence similarly depend on the 
contingencies of the labor market. The cognitive dissonance between the main- 
stream's sense of security and these "betrayers of the American dream" (Murphy, 
1987: 116-17; see also Wuthnow, 1996) was relieved by creating an identity for the 
poor that makes them different - self-indulgent, foolish, improvident, pleasure- 
seeking, or corrupt. Today, in a world of increasingly insecure labor conditions, 
these characterizations of the mainstream and the poor are no longer merely unself- 
conscious underpinnings of identity but appear at the forefront of poverty politics 
that keep an insecure working class allied with employers who are hostile to public 
and private welfare. Gans always claimed the sources of punitive attitudes toward 
the poor were much more concrete and visible. The existence of the poor benefits 
more affluent citizens, taxpayers at large, and government administrators. Stereo- 
typical thinking about the underclass makes it easier to go on enjoying these benefits. 
Jonathan Simon (1997) has brought to our attention the increasing importance of 
the image of the "other" in American governance. Simon has demonstrated that the 
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growing divisions among racial groups and between rich and poor have greatly 
altered our expectations for and practices of governance. The fact that such divisions 
are marked by differences in culture and political perspective makes consensus, 
negotiation, and reconciliation of conflicts among the interests of these groups 
difficult. Simon argues that an image of the criminal "other"- a person of color, 
poor, predatory, and urban - drives a wide range of public policies of containment, 
separation, statistically based crime prevention, and punishment that affect not only 
criminal justice but also land use, transportation, public funding of schools, national 
electoral politics, and other major institutional arenas. 
Poverty, like crime, is also a means of governance. Welfare recipients, like crim- 
inals, are stereotyped, reinforcing an image of an "other" whose morally undeserv- 
ing behavior explains and motivates policies of redistribution and regulation. 
Welfare dependency is perceived to be a pervasive moral threat, a fear legitimated 
by the stereotypical identities attached to welfare mothers. Patricia Williams (1991) 
asks what could possibly justify the shocking murder of a welfare mother in her 
apartment by fully armed police for "resisting eviction?" Roberts (1997a) describes 
"genocide" through family planning programs whose racially disparate practices 
have a significant impact on reproduction among poor black women. Images of the 
unmarried teenage black woman render the public unsympathetic to welfare recipi- 
ents and favorable to punitive conditions and harsh sanctions (L. Williams, 1995). 
Like crime, welfare - and the racial stereotypes that sustain it - help constitute the 
relationship between social hierarchy and social order. 
To conduct more relevant and effective research on poverty, scholars must ac- 
knowledge the deep racial fault line in American society and its effects on the 
identity, self-concept, and behavior of the poor. Race is nearly invisible in main- 
stream policy research on poverty, and this despite an incontrovertible reality: not 
only are the experiences of persons of color who are poor different, but different at 
least in part because persons of color are perceived and treated differently. Martin 
Gilens (1999) observes a fundamental premise - unexamined in most research on 
poverty - of the public perception of welfare in the United States: welfare (much like 
crime) is a province populated by African Americans. 
Scholars who want to understand poverty and the public policy debates that 
surround it must grapple with race-coded discourse. Euphemisms such as "the 
underclass," "welfare poor," and "cycle of poverty" may sanitize language, but 
they cannot mask our racialized perceptions of poverty. Nor can they mask the 
continuing processes of cultural and institutional separation that isolate African 
Americans from the mainstream. Our race-coded discourse about poverty divides 
the poor and working classes into two groups: whites who suffer the effects of 
declining wages, benefits, and job security and therefore are deserving; and blacks 
who a priori are stigmatized as potential welfare recipients and therefore are 
undeserving. Until this divide is bridged, Gilens suggests, little will change in the 
symbolic politics of poverty. 
Our concerns about the deep divide between blacks and whites in America, as well 
as the persistence of patriarchal values, should lead us to a more profound under- 
standing of the stakes in the economic order that fuel them (see insightful criticism 
by J. Williams, 1999; Roberts, 1997b). The division created by race is ultimately 
part of a larger and more complex story of race, gender, and class, as Jonathan 
Simon suggests, which greatly complicates the identities of the poor but also creates 
a broader potential for political change. 
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The problem of politics 
Underlying the moral politics, welfare in all its forms has served dominant economic 
interests, especially their interest in stabilizing the supply of labor. Katz (2001) 
describes the relationship among the American welfare state's three sectors - public, 
independent (not-for-profit), and private. The private sector consists primarily of 
employee pension and medical care, together with mixed public-private welfare 
such as unemployment and workers compensation programs. One reason that the 
stigma attaching to public welfare programs has remained difficult to change is the 
political split between segments of the working class created by the mix of public 
and private welfare - workers dependent upon private, contributory welfare are 
opposed to being taxed a second time to support public welfare for still poorer, and 
typically minority, unemployed persons (see Noble, 1997). Some political move- ' 
ments by poor people have been sufficiently destabilizing in domestic politics to 
influence the passage of more favorable legislation (Piven and Cloward, 1971). 
More often, carefully limited liberalization of public welfare, for example during 
the New Deal, has been supported by larger employers interested in labor market 
stability. 
Contemporary welfare reform is just one of many related changes in public and 
private governance that is supported by stereotyping groups, that dominant 
economic interests want to control (Garland, 2001). The attack on "dependency" 
has included downsizing workers compensation, reducing worker security and 
representation, restricting consumer access to bankruptcy, limiting relief to un- 
employed and displaced workers, and contention over health insurance reform 
(see McCluskey, 1999; Katz, 2001). Workers' benefits not related to the bottom 
line are characterized as a form of economic fat, privilege, and immoral depend- 
ency, the mirror image of efficient, market-driven, and, therefore, "fair" labor 
policy. All of these active interventions by the state to reregulate the labor market 
enable employers to pursue low wage and flexible labor strategies to increase 
profitability. 
The assault on dependency thus creates a potential basis for broad political 
coalition. Still more broadly, as Gilliom (2001) has suggested, the common experi- 
ence of welfare state surveillance and control of citizens may provide an even wider 
source of shared understanding and political action. 
When law fails in its promise to become an effective enabling force for protecting 
equal rights in the welfare state, we are left with "the long walk home ... to politics" 
(Simon, 1992). The question is how to think about welfare politics. This final task 
for law and society scholars has already been begun by examining the mutually 
constitutive role of identity, welfare policies, and the practices of governance. Recent 
law and society studies examine the effects of enacted law on everyday lives of 
marginal and excluded persons (Engel and Munger, forthcoming; Munger, 2002; 
L. White, study of Head Start mothers, in preparation), while others document 
processes of constituency building, media imaging, and administration (Davis, 
1993; Diamond, 2000; Piven and Cloward, 1977; McCann, 1994; L. Williams, 
1995; Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande, 1993; Handler, 1996; Seron, Van Ryzin, 
Frankel, and Kovath, 2001). But few have examined the process of political change 
suggested by feminist histories (Minow, 1990; Schneider, 2000): how a cycle initi- 
ated through reinterpretation of identities, movement building, and enactment of 
law might lead to change for the poor. 
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CONCLUSION 
O'Connor has faulted mainstream poverty scholars for allowing themselves to be 
coopted by the moral framework of conservatives and failing to create an effective 
alternative understanding of the institutional sources of poverty. Yet many sociolegal 
scholars who study law and poverty believe they are on a different course. Their 
research has been motivated by a desire to expose injustice, tell the stories of those 
oppressed by law, explain why such inequality persists in the welfare state, and 
thereby create openings for change. Three qualities of recent law and society poverty 
research suggest the importance of this commitment. 
First, for most sociolegal scholars studying poverty the issue is now inequality, not 
whether the poor have legal experiences that are different from the mainstream. 
Critical histories of the origins of poverty programs and studies that relate poverty to 
governance of the morally undeserving - the poor, unmarried mothers, minorities, 
criminals, and the "underclass" - demonstrate that they are kept isolated and poor in 
part because of benefits that others derive from law. 
Second, researchers are no longer "seeing like a state" (Scott, 1998). Most re- 
searchers have rejected the conceptualization of the poor that informs poverty policy 
and administration and discourages research on race, the causes of poverty, and the 
labor market. Ethnography, interpretive sociology, and cultural studies have 
created sightlines for understanding poverty that are different from the state's 
own. Government-sponsored research, conducted according to a more limited 
vision, plays an important role in legitimating welfare policy making but must 
now be read in the context of research by sociolegal scholars and others that speaks 
directly to the value of such policies from another perspective. 
Third, scholars suggest many roles for themselves in bringing about social change. 
Impact research and detailed case studies that describe processes underlying poverty 
and injustice speak explicitly to the impulse toward (and faith in) reform. Studies of 
voices of the oppressed, legal consciousness and resistance, and the poor's political 
capacity attempt to share the scholar's power to create knowledge with those who 
have the most direct need for it and the greatest interest in change. The latter are 
"participatory" in spirit - speaking with the oppressed so that scholars can accur- 
ately represent their cause. Some scholars are self-consciously participatory in 
method as well. Increasingly, scholarship suggests strategies for the activist scholar 
or the scholar in collaboration with the political allies and subjects of poverty 
research. Strategies include exploration of genuinely participatory methods for 
research, debates about more egalitarian and mutually empowering relationships 
with clients, mapping the opportunities for broader democratic participation in 
resistance, rights-related movements, and a more inclusive moral discourse. 
Scholarship on the relationships between poverty, inequality, and governance still 
leaves many questions unanswered. Fortunately, sociolegal research suggests places 
to begin answering the questions that poverty scholars find most compelling. 
Scholars pursue a better understanding of who controls the market and how law 
helps or hinders them. Scholars want to know more about how moral identity is 
formed and changed. Research may eventually suggest how to "democratize" pov- 
erty by making the identity of poor persons more visible and less alien to a large 
proportion of the citizenry in modern, economically developed societies. Further, 
power and change are often mediated by local social organization and politics, a vast 
RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF CLASS 
347 
uncharted terrain concerning the relationships between local empowerment and 
laws that guide "devolution," "decentralization," and "marketization." 
Finally, there is an emerging consensus that social change through rights will 
frequently depend on politics. Politics may include the micropolitics of individual 
resistance, but more significantly will require organizing movements in the public 
arena. Scholars have suggested that there are openings for political escalation of 
poverty issues. Movements may successfully deploy new rights, but have often failed 
in their attempts to do so. Thus, scholars' most ambitious project is understanding 
how the poor's experiences - including their experiences of subordination and 
stigmatizing moral identity - can merge with the political interests of other citizens 
in movements for rights that will enable reconstruction of a more democratic and 
egalitarian affirmative state. 
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